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Abstract—This paper describes a proposal to develop patterns
of security postures for computer based socio-technical systems
and systems-of-systems. Such systems typically span many or-
ganisational boundaries, integrating multiple computer systems,
infrastructures and organisational processes. The paper describes
the motivation for the proposed work, and our approach to the
development, specification, integration and validation of security
patterns for socio-technical and system-of-system scale systems.
:
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of a software design pattern, a tailorable
solution to a recurring design problem, was first popularised
by Gamma et al. (1994). These patterns addressed small scale,
object oriented, software design problems, typically involving
the arrangement of a small number of software classes. Design
patterns have also been applied at other scales in software and
systems engineering, including software architectures (Shaw
and Garlan (1996) is one of many texts on the topic) and the
analysis of patterns of work (Martin and Sommerville, 2004).
There has been considerable interest in the application of
patterns to a range of information security domains. Security
patterns have been proposed in contexts such as distributed
access control (Erber et al., 2007), operating systems (Fernan-
dez et al., 2006), and web application development (Kienzle
and Elder, 2001). There have also been surveys of the state
of the art, Yoshioka et al. (2008) for example, and a book on
development with security patterns (Schumacher et al., 2005).
This existing research has addressed the application of a
patterns approach to information security design problems at
the software system scale. However, as Siponen and Heikka
(2008) also noted, there is currently a lack of established
engineering practice, tools or methods that address informa-
tion security design problems at the socio-technical system
and system-of-system scale. Such systems are based around
information technology (IT) applications and infrastructures,
and can be characterised as:
• very large scale, consisting of multiple heterogeneous
organisations, work flows, actors, software applications,
middlewares and hardware platforms; and
• very long lived, with evolutionary development occurring
across organisational boundaries as the system context
changes, users change, individual components are up-
dated and new requirements are established.
The challenges of addressing general engineering problems
for systems at these scales is well reported in the literature
(Sommerville et al., 2011; Boardman and Sauser, 2006).
Diverse examples of such systems include inter-agency civil
emergency response (Sommerville et al., 2009a), logistics
management (Baskerville and Siponen, 2002), election and
voting management systems (Lock et al., 2008), space based
infrastructures (Boin and Fischbacher-Smith, 2011) and elec-
tronic trading systems (Sommerville et al., 2011). The adop-
tion of virtualised, remote and distributed cloud computing
infrastructures will exacerbate the complexity of engineering
at this scale.
It is recognised that such systems are vulnerable to informa-
tion security threats that are both evolving and increasing in
scale and complexity. Future ‘cyber’ attacks will be directed
at multiple systems, infrastructures, organisations and nation
states simultaneously (Research Councils UK, 2011; UK Of-
fice of Cyber Security and UK Cyber Security Operations
Centre, 2009). Threats will combine both external activity
and malicious ‘insider’ behaviour. In the future, systems that
enable and support collaborative information security across
organisational boundaries will be essential. To respond to this
challenge, there is a need to develop engineering methods
that address the design of security into systems at the socio-
technical and system-of-systems scale.
To begin to address this challenge, this paper argues for the
development of:
• methods for the identification, documentation and valida-
tion of design patterns of information security postures
for socio-technical systems and systems of systems;
• an initial repository of validated design patterns which
can be applied to recurring security problems at the socio-
technical and system-of-systems scale;
• a method for selecting and tailoring a design pattern to a
specific system context; and
• methods for evaluating the suitability of a proposed socio-
technical security design for a specific context through
modelling and simulation.
The work proposed will adapt the well established pattern
approach to system design to the socio-technical and system-
of-system scale. The pattern repository will provide a source
of guidance for engineers seeking to address large scale
information security design problems. The application method
will allow design patterns to be selected and tailored to specific
socio-technical contexts. This approach will allow existing
craft and experience to be formalised in engineering methods
and tools.
This paper describes the initial results of this work, and is
structured as follows. Section II illustrates our approach to
documenting information security design patterns for socio-
technical systems. The patterns approach is illustrated using
a detailed example of a security incident response team in
an organisation. Section III briefly enumerates other patterns
that we have identified, illustrating the breadth of applicability
of the approach. Finally, Section IV summaries the work and
points to future directions. In particular, we describe future
work on the the validation of socio-technical system designs
through the use of multi-agent simulation.
II. DESCRIPTION OF METHOD
Following the patterns approach, a Socio-Technical Infor-
mation Security Design Pattern will include:
• The context of an socio-technical security problem,
explaining the circumstances in which the pattern can
be applied. The context section of the pattern describes
the configuration of organisational vulnerabilities, known
threats and attacker capabilities that can be addressed
or mitigated through the application of the pattern. This
part of the pattern is equivalent to a threat model that is
typically described before a security design is proposed
to address it.
• A template for a socio-technical solution combining
information systems, human actors and processes.
Specifically, the template solution will describe the roles
and responsibilities of relevant actors within the organi-
sation, and the communication channels and information
requirements for the actors to discharge their responsibil-
ities.
There are several notations for modelling socio-technical
systems, notably: goal based notations, such as TROPOS
(Giorgini et al., 2005); and the SysUML (Hause, 2006).
There is also the STAMP method for identifying systemic
hazards in systems of systems (Leveson, 2004). However,
we have found the notion of responsibility useful in
analysing and describing socio-technical systems in terms
of the actors in an organisation, the responsibilities they
hold and discharge and the information they require and
produce (Sommerville et al., 2009b).
Lock and Sommerville (2010) demonstrated the feasibil-
ity of using an extension of the responsibility notation to
capture key aspects of systems-of-systems. Consequently,
we anticipate that the graphical notation (Sommerville
et al., 2009a) we have previously developed for modelling
the socio-technical and system-of-system contexts will be
appropriate for describing socio-technical security pattern
templates, in a similar way to the specification of software
design patterns in UML.
• The trade-offs, including any disadvantages, that must
be considered when applying the pattern. This part of
the pattern will be developed through analysis of previous
case studies and work with industrial partners. We will
identify both the benefits of applying the pattern for
information security at the socio-technical level, as well
as any risks that are introduced.
• Any related socio-technical and/or software security
patterns. Many design pattern schemes list relations
within the same family of patterns, so that, for example,
patterns which complement each other can be identified.
In this section, we will identify related socio-technical
information security patterns that complement one an-
other. In addition, we will identify software security
patterns, already documented in the existing literature,
that complement a socio-technical pattern. This approach
will support an integrated socio-technical approach to
system security, allowing the consequences of security
design decisions at different levels of abstraction and
scale to be evaluated.
We briefly sketch an example socio-technical security pat-
tern to illustrate our proposed approach. Figure 1 illustrates
the pattern for a Security Incident Response Team (SIRT).
The context describes the threat model in which the pattern
is applicable: when an organisation perceives some informa-
tion security breaches as inevitable due to a large, distributed,
heterogeneous infrastructure or rapidly changing insider ca-
pabilities, which make a secure system difficult to achieve.
In addition, the pattern is applicable when it may be cheaper
to respond to and mitigate attacks, rather than attempting to
prevent them occurring at all.
The solution template responsibility model contains five
actor roles, denoted using the UML stick figure stereotype.
The Incident coordinator, responsible for collecting incident
reports and initiating investigations. Employee represents a
general member of the organisation. The Automated monitor
is a software component that can be configured to report suspi-
cious system activity, such as inappropriate file accesses, failed
login attempts or firewall probes. The Incident manager,
responsible for directing the focus of a specific investigation.
The Incident investigator, responsible for gathering and
analysing evidence under the direction of the investigation
manager.
Note that the model describes actor roles, rather than
specific actors. Consequently, the pattern is applicable to both
large organisations, where the role of incident coordinator,
manager and investigator may be distinct, and smaller organ-
isations, where all these roles may be undertaken by a single
IT worker.
In addition, actor roles may be undertaken by humans,
organisations or technical components. In the responsibility
modelling notation, any object can be modelled as an actor
if the modeller perceives the actors to have intent and be
able to hold a responsibility. This flexibility makes responsi-
bility modelling useful for capturing different scales of socio-
technical system.
Title: Security Incident Response Team (SIRT)
Problem
Context
An organisation maintains a diverse collection of interconnected systems and infrastructures, used by
many different actors with rapidly changing privileges. Attackers may be either external, or internal,
exploiting one or more vulnerabilities in different parts of the organisation’s systems.
It is not considered feasible to prevent every security incident, but the extent of damage caused by
attacks on the systems is often dependent on the time taken to respond to the attack.
Solution
Template
Employee
Automated
Monitor
Incident
Coordinator
Collect
incident
reports
Report
suspected
incident
InitialIncidentReport
ReportingPolicy
Initiate
investigation
Publicise
reporting
policy
Coordinate
investigation
Collate and
report findings
Incident
Manager
Escalate
incident
IncidentReport
Investigator
Collect and
analyse
evidence
EvidenceReport
Advantages
and disad-
vantages
The pattern provides the organisation with a means of identifying and responding rapidly to evolving
security incidents. There is a risk that the system will generate too many false positives (particularly in
the aftermath of a breach) swamping the organisation’s ability to respond effectively.
Related
patterns
Security policy management team; Secure logging framework;Incident reporting information system
Fig. 1. An example socio-technical security pattern.
The model illustrates the responsibilities held by each of the
roles, and the information that is required or produced by them.
Responsibilities are denoted in lozenges, while information
resources are represented as UML classes (it is possible to
specify class attributes if desired). An agent holding a respon-
sibility is denoted using a UML association dependency. The
UML transition dependency is used to denote the production
or requirement of information to discharge a responsibility.
The Incident Coordinator is responsible for publicising
the incident reporting procedure and the responsibility of
employees to report incidents. The model shows that an
employee is responsible for reporting suspicious events for fur-
ther investigation. The Incident Coordinator will undertake an
initial assessment and initiate a further investigation if deemed
necessary. Part of this responsibility is to appoint a manager for
the incident, responsible for coordinating investigation efforts.
The incident manager will direct the evidence gathering efforts
of investigators and collate them into a full incident report.
Finally, the Incident Coordinator is responsible for deciding
whether to escalate an incident or not.
The pattern explains both the advantages of disadvantages
of the SIRT model. In particular, it is noted that the system
may generate too many false positive reports, leading to
resources being consumed investigating non-incidents. This
may be a particular problem where poorly trained employees
are required to report incidents, or where automated monitor-
ing software is not correctly configured. There may also be
variability in incident reports, particularly in the aftermath of
a reported breach.
As can be seem from the figure, socio-technical security
patterns modelled on responsibilities can also be used to
denote the information that is required and produced through
the discharge of a responsibility. This documentation can then
be used to identify the requirements for the supporting techni-
cal and administrative of an organisation. These requirements
can sometimes be expressed as related design patterns (both
technical and socio-technical).
In the pattern described in Figure 1, for example:
• The Employee and the Automated Monitor needs a means
of communicating an incident to the Incident Coordinator
in a standardised way. A standard layered information
system for collecting reports should support this require-
ment by providing a software interface to the automated
monitor and a user interface to the employee.
• The incident manager and investigators need information
concerning the state of parts of the technical infrastruc-
ture in the lead up to an incident. The socio-technical
security pattern thus drives the need for a secure logging
framework for the technical infrastructure.
• There needs to be a means of ensuring that employees
of the organisation are familiar with their responsibilities
to report incidents and the procedure for doing so. Con-
sequently, the security policy management team pattern
is recorded as a related pattern. This pattern describes
how the organisation manages and communicates security
policies to its employees.
The example illustrates how socio-technical security pat-
terns can provide an over-arching and integrating framework
for software level security patterns.
III. OTHER PATTERNS
This section of the paper provides a brief catalogue of
further (elaborated) socio-technical security design patterns
that we have identified at the time of writing.
• Security policy management team, including a security
policy coordinator for the organisation.
• Inter–organisational response team, providing a means of
communicating security incidents between organisations
within a trusted environment.
• Inter-organisational ad-hoc secure channel, inspired by
the security breaches (and remedies) encountered during
data transmission between the United Kingdom’s Rev-
enue and Custom and National Audit Office (Poynter,
2008). The pattern provides a means for secure commu-
nication when relationships between agencies are ad-hoc
and intermittent.
• Credential and authorisation manager, provides a single
point of contact within an organisation for registering new
users, removing privileges of departing employees and
managing authorisations as roles change.
• Software patch management team, providing for a disci-
plined approach to evolving software configurations in a
large-scale heterogeneous Information Infrastructure.
• Off-site fail-over, prevents the organisation from failing
should the main IT infrastructure site be damaged due to
man-made or natural disaster.
• Intra–organisational firewall, allows an organisation to
partition information internally to prevent conflicts of
interest arising.
• Secure decommissioning process for data storage devices,
ensuring they are disposed of without compromising
organisational data security.
Space considerations prevent a detailed description of these
patterns. However, the examples listed (and others) hints at
the breadth of the applicability of the approach.
IV. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
The global information rich society is increasingly depen-
dent on large scale computer based systems and infrastruc-
tures. These systems are increasingly threatened by threats
capable of mounting attacks of increasing sophistication and
scale. We believe that the development of patterns of socio-
technical security postures addresses these security threats at
an equivalent scale. This paper has outlined our envisioned
approach, including the use of responsibility modelling as a
core abstraction.
A key challenge at this scale is the validation of designs
prior to their deployment. Mistakes in system design can be
much more expensive to correct once implementation has
begun. In the current state of the art, validation of the design of
large scale, socio-technical systems is notoriously difficult. A
trial and error approach, until an acceptable design is achieved,
is often employed. This can often result in system failures
during initial deployments as problems are gradually rectified.
Alternatively, systems may fail catastrophically and projects
abandoned if socio-technical failures cause rapid declines in
confidence in a system.
We propose to use the development of executable simula-
tions of large scale systems as a means of validating socio-
technical security patterns. We are investigating the use of
multi-agent technologies that incorporate the responsibility
modelling technique for capturing socio-technical structures.
A repository of patterns will provide a re-usable collection of
designs that can be applied to a multi-agent simulation of a
socio-technical system, prior to deployment. Our vision is that
the validity of applying a given socio-technical security pattern
to a design problem can be tested first through simulation
before a decision to commit to a substantial re-organisation is
made. This paper has described the first steps in this direction.
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